The Case for Transparent Oversight of Cohere’s Defence Partnerships
Author
Danielle Louzado
Editor
Tyler Stevenson
Publications Lead
Zainab Ibraheem
The Government of Canada’s recent investment of up to $1.6 billion in Cohere, a made-in-Canada artificial intelligence (AI) company, rested largely on the grounds that it will strengthen Canadian sovereignty and security.i But does an AI company that found its start in Canada automatically translate to stronger sovereignty and security for Canadians?
While this investment offers promising economic growth for Canada and a domestic alternative to foreign AI models, more transparent government oversight is needed regarding how Cohere’s technologies are used in its defence-related agreements with foreign governments and international firms. Without this, Canadian technology could be used to support foreign military activity without the knowledge of the Canadian government, which could inadvertently leave Canada’s own security exposed and at risk. This piece examines Cohere’s international ties and potential risks partnerships could create, as well as gaps in existing oversight, before recommending policy solutions.
Canadian Cohere Goes International
“Born in Canada, building worldwide” is one of the first lines that appears on Cohere’s homepage.ii Since its establishment in 2019 by University of Toronto alumni Aidan Gomez, Nick Frosst, and Ivan Zhang, Cohere has expanded internationally, building additional offices in San Francisco, New York, London, Montreal, Paris, Seoul, and Berlin.iii Although Cohere has committed to remaining incorporated in Canada, each country has its own laws on how data can be accessed and used, leaving room for inconsistencies and confusion in how they are applied. For instance, while Canada operates through an opt-in approach, the US generally uses an opt-out basis, through which companies can use and collect customers’ personal data unless they request the company to stop.iv More critically, expansion across borders creates exposure to greater risk of potential security breaches, such as in the case of Equifax which saw the transfer of customer data between Canada and the US without customer consent.v The international ties that influence defence and security the most can be broken down into the following three categories: investors and owners, foreign governments, and foreign defence firms.
Firstly, investors and owners influence Cohere’s funding structure and therefore may affect its subsequent partnerships, priorities, and data management practices. For instance, the Schwarz Group, the German retailer behind Lidl, made a $600 million Series E investment, alongside an investment from the American technology company, Nvidia Corp.vi Nvidia’s recent scandal tells a cautionary tale about the security risks that may come with these international partnerships. CEO Jensen Huang’s affair with a woman that U.S. officials believe to be a Chinese spy not only put the company’s security at risk but also dropped Nvidia’s valuation by US$600 million, impacting its partners by association.vii While this scandal has raised security questions for Nvidia, it also poses concerns for Cohere; it is unclear how much discretion Nvidia will have in Cohere’s structure and operations following their Series E investment and its decision-making is currently being put under intense scrutiny after the scandal.
In 2026, Cohere also signed a merger agreement with the German AI software firm, Aleph Alpha, and frames it as the first transatlantic AI solution.viii The Schwarz Group has even indicated that it plans to run Cohere’s models on its own cloud infrastructure, STACKIT.ix Cohere has not yet publicly explained who will control the data, and which jurisdiction will apply following the merger with German company Aleph Alpha. The European Union is known for having more comprehensive digital security and privacy laws, so stronger protection is not the primary concern here.x Rather, the issue is that a company that operates under two legal systems with headquarters in both Canada and Germany may face varying legal and privacy laws without clear parameters laid out on which jurisdiction applies. Cohere has not made it evident what — if any — privacy and security changes will be made following the merger. This partnership also raises questions about how a Canadian-German company will continue to prioritize Canadian sovereignty –– an essential component of Cohere’s original brand. While both Cohere and Aleph Alpha emphasize their commitment to sovereign AI and upholding consumers’ security, clear safeguards must be established so users and governments understand where and how their data is being used following the change in ownership.xi
Beyond partnerships with other companies, Cohere has invited foreign governments to work with it to develop their AI systems for the delivery of public goods, which creates room for conflicts of interest if Canada is not kept informed of these partnerships.xii In June 2025, Cohere signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the UK government.xiii Though not binding, it proposes working together to advance the UK’s AI capabilities, training, and development in defence, and collaborating with the UK’s AI Security Institute to inform future policies.xiv The UK is a close ally of Canada, and the UK-Cohere partnership was announced alongside Cohere’s separate partnership with the Canadian government, mitigating the potential for domestic risk. However, the agreement shows that Cohere is already exploring defence work for governments outside Canada, and it is unclear how much discretion the Canadian government would have if Cohere chose to partner with countries that are not Canadian allies. Even with allies, Cohere’s work could risk diverging from Canadian priorities without strategic coordination with the Canadian government to avoid duplication or undermining domestic security efforts.
Additionally, Cohere has formed defence-related agreements with foreign firms. For example, Cohere partnered with ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems (TKMS), a German naval defence company, to build an AI-powered data platform for TKMS’ internal business purposes, such as a company-wide AI data and integration platform, while TKMS seeks to advance the Canadian Patrol Submarine Project.xv Cohere also signed an agreement with the Swedish firm, Saab, to serve the GlobalEye opportunity in Canada — a multi-domain Airborne Early Warning and Control solution — along with future international GlobalEye operators.xvi This future-oriented scope presents risks for Canada; it remains unclear where future GlobalEye operators will be established and how they will affect Canada, and no safeguards have been made public. This agreement also shows that Cohere’s work is not limited to Canada’s security priorities and that other countries can also use its technology to achieve their own military objectives.
Military and Security Risks
The first risk concerns shared access to Cohere’s technologies for defence purposes. While some of Cohere’s base models are open source, models used for security and defence are closed source. If this version were also offered to other governments for tasks like military simulations, there is a risk of reverse engineering being conducted on Cohere to understand Canada’s intelligence services by studying the outputs to learn how it reasons and better predict Canada’s defence responses and strategies.xvii
Secondly, there is a risk concerning allies’ shifting interests. As the evolving relationship with the current US administration and ongoing trade war illustrate, even longstanding allies can make decisions that are not in Canada’s best interest. If a friendly country were to similarly shift their foreign policies, it could hypothetically place Canada in a position of weakness if Cohere continued to share its proprietary AI models with another country, therefore providing it with resources to strengthen its defence capacity. As a private firm seeking to maximize its profits, Cohere may have little incentive to put Canadian interests ahead of a lucrative foreign contract. Although Ottawa — and subsequently taxpayers — now have a stake in Cohere, it is unclear what input the government has in Cohere’s operations, the size of its ownership stake, and what security and defence conditions related to the agreement and Cohere’s operations exist.
Existing Oversight and Gaps
The Government of Canada maintains the discretion to initiate a national security review of any foreign investments that it believes could harm national security.xviii In 2024-25, 30 investments were subject to extended reviews, with only one resulting in a decision from the Governor in Council for the Canadian business to wind up, while nine investments were withdrawn by the investors.xix This shows that national security reviews influence investors’ decisions and the operations of Canadian firms. Yet, this discretion is limited to who invests in a company, and there is no public information confirming if any security review was conducted to verify that the Cohere-Aleph Alpha merger and Schwarz’s equity stake do not pose any security risks prior to this investment being made.
Further, it is unclear what mechanisms the Canadian government holds to monitor how Cohere’s technology is used in its defence-related agreements. While these reviews are confidential and not generally disclosed to the public, it would strengthen public trust in both the government and Cohere to know that the proper checks and balances were conducted prior to this agreement being made, and that they will continue to be done moving forward. Since the Canadian government now has a stake in Cohere — funded by taxpayers — Canadians should also have the right to some degree of public disclosure.
Under the Export and Import Permits Act (EIPA), the Canadian government regulates export and import controls for military and strategic goods and technology; however, there remains criticism as highlighted by Private Member’s Bill C-233, the “No More Loopholes Act.” This Bill, which was rejected through a vote in March 2026, underlined how Canadian technology can be used to support conflicts in which Canada is not implicated when secondary countries use Canada’s defence-related exports, including technology.xx Therefore, in addition to potentially being directly used against Canada’s interests, Cohere’s international partnerships could be used to further defence and security goals that do not align with Canada’s values and security objectives.
Balancing Oversight and Commercial Competitiveness
While stronger government oversight and public clarity on measures being taken to protect Canadian security and sovereignty would serve Canadians, they pose challenges for a private firm like Cohere. Firstly, a requirement to notify the government before defence-related agreements could slow down competitive agreements and discourage foreign companies and governments from partnering with Cohere, reducing its competitiveness. For partnerships related to Canada, it could also cause a conflict of interest, such as with TKMS and the Canadian Patrol Submarine Project, where Canada would need to review Cohere’s agreement prior to bidders being allowed to access its services. Lastly, it could increase the administrative burden by requiring further reporting on top of existing regulations.
While these concerns are valid, they indicate the need for careful design when developing an oversight mechanism rather than avoiding one altogether. The proposed safeguards involve notifying and reporting on the agreements rather than seeking formal approval, so that Cohere would remain in control of its partnerships. Additionally, this would only apply to defence-related agreements, reducing the administrative burden. To protect confidentiality, the reviews could also be undertaken by a third party, which is kept separate from the procurement process, to ensure no conflicts of interest during the bid selection process.
Recommendations
1. Require Cohere to notify the Government of Canada prior to entering defence-related agreements with foreign governments or firms.
Innovation, Science, and Economic Development Canada (ISED) should make it a condition of the government’s investment that Cohere notify it, in confidence, before entering any defence-related agreements with foreign governments or firms. This requirement would give the federal government visibility into arrangements without a veto over Cohere’s commercial decisions, enabling it to anticipate and respond to potential agreements that advance military goals incongruent with Canada’s strategic objectives.
2. Require Cohere to submit an annual report to the Government of Canada.
ISED should require Cohere to submit an annual report, including a section on international partnerships, and a public summary to ensure accountability to Canadians. This proposal addresses the lack of oversight into how Cohere’s technology is used abroad. Because it only covers partnerships, the added administrative burden should be relatively minor. The summary would be high-level to protect commercially sensitive information.
3. Cohere should clarify which jurisdiction will govern data following the merger, and where the data will be hosted.
Cohere should publicly state which jurisdiction will govern data following the merger with Aleph Alpha and where that data will be hosted. This would provide clarity as to whose law and security standards apply to Canadians’ information and would similarly present a limited administrative burden as it is only related to disclosing available information.
4. The Government of Canada and Cohere should publicly disclose the size of its ownership stake and any security or defence conditions related to the agreement, as well as confirm whether a national security review was conducted prior to the merger taking place.
ISED should publicly disclose the size of the ownership stake, high-level security or defence conditions attached to the investment, and confirm whether a national security review took place. To protect the confidentiality of the security review process, only a high-level summary statement would be released.
Conclusion
Ultimately, while there are certainly economic and security-related benefits to the government’s investment in Cohere, more transparent oversight is needed over how Cohere’s technology is used in international defence-related partnerships. The recommendations proposed in this piece are relatively narrow and focus on reporting and monitoring, rather than a complete veto by the federal government, to ensure Cohere can continue to expand its global reach while upholding Canadian security and sovereignty. The company has reiterated the importance of sovereignty, and these recommendations aim to help achieve this goal. As Canada continues to grow its domestic AI technologies, the terms of its agreement with Cohere will shape future agreements and help safeguard Canadian AI sovereignty.